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ABSTRACT
The paper describes a knowledge based system (KBS) for modelling trust in
the Certification Authority (CA) of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). It was
built using a graphical KBS toolkit, Istar, that allows the knowledge builder to
easily model the important relationships between concepts of the domain. The
knowledge base was initially built using published work and was subsequently
extended by knowledge obtained from leading PKI experts. The first prototype
system computes the trust in a CA by asking the user a series of questions
about the CA's Certification Practice Statement. Examples of its use with two
well known public CAs is discussed.
An important issue raised and discussed in this paper is how to map symbols
in the KB to the knowledge level of human trust and beliefs, for such an
ill-defined area of knowledge as trust, and four main mappings have been
identified. Another issue that emerged relates to the use of questionnaires
during knowledge acquisition. The expert system is currently available online
via the Istar Knowledge Server, and future work is discussed.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Problem
When compared with face to face communication, the Internet suffers from
many disadvantages. We can easily recognise people in face to face
communications, but on the Internet it is very easy to masquerade. During
face to face communications we can observe subtle gestures and body
language, that help us to determine the authenticity of the speaker. Neither of
these are currently possible on the Internet. The advent of the Internet thus
raises important issues of authenticity and trust.
One attempt to address these issues involves the use of a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) (Adams and Lloyd, 1999), which is a system for the
identification of people (and systems) based on the use of a trusted third party
(TTP) called a Certification Authority (CA). This CA is responsible for verifying
the identities of people and providing them with certified public keys that
contain their identity and that of the CA. Each certified public key, or
certificate, is digitally signed by the CA, making them tamperproof and easy
to distribute. A recipient can be assured they have a valid copy of a subject's
public key, by checking the digital signature on the certificate (providing of
course they have a trusted copy of the CA's public key). The subject's validated
public key may then be used to verify messages digitally signed by their
corresponding private key.
It is absolutely central to the working of the PKI that the CA carries out
rigorous procedures for the checking of identities, for the generation, storage
and destruction of its private keys, and maintains the safety and security of its
systems, data and software. Weakness in any of these areas may allow fake
certificates to be created (by fake we mean that the private key corresponding
to the certified public key is not held by the subject identified in the
certificate). There are now many CAs in operation and it is a fact that they do
not all operate to the same standards with regard to the above procedures and
other essential criteria. Consequently some CAs will be inherently more
trustworthy than others, and the reliability of the identity to public key
binding, implied by their certificates, will differ from CA to CA.
The procedures that a CA claims that it carries out are described in its
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) and/or its Certificate Policy (CP). The
difference betweek these two documents is still the subject of some debate
and confusion, as they arose from different working groups. Certificate Policy
is defined in the ITU-T X.509 standard (ISO/ITU-T, 1997) as "The named set of
rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community
and/or class of applications", whilst Certification Practice Statement is defined
by the American Bar Association in its Digital Signature Guidelines
(Information Security Committee, 1996) as "A statement of the practices
which a certification authority employs in issuing certificates". Clearly the
scope of the two documents overlaps, and some CAs produce CPs, some
produce CPSs and some both. A template for the production of CPs and CPSs is
described in Chokhani and Ford (1999). These documents should be published
by the CA, and be readily available to those (hereafter called 'relying parties')
who wish to assess the authenticity of the sender of a digitally signed
communication. By analysing these documents a relying party (RP) should be
able to form a judgement about the trustworthiness of the CA.
1.2 An Expert System Solution
However, such analysis and judgement requires expertise, which most relying
parties cannot be expected to possess. Not only are there dozens of factors
that must be taken into account in such an assessment, but most relying
parties do not have enough expertise to know whether the methods described
in the CPS provide sufficient authentication.
If such expertise can be embedded in an expert system, then any relying party
should be able to benefit from it. Our objective, therefore, was to encapsulate
such expert knowledge in an expert system, and make it available on the
World Wide Web, so that any relying party that uses it could gain an indication
of the trustworthiness of a CA by answering a series of questions about the
CPS/CP published by that CA. On the basis of this, a recipient of an Internet
communication can then determine how much trust to place in the stated
identity of the sender.
Here we describe an expert system that is able to provide a measure of the
trustworthiness of a CA. The output of the expert system is a trust quotient, in
the range from zero to one. A value of one means that the CA would be
believed by the experts to be totally trustworthy, whilst a value of zero means
that the CA would be believed by the experts to be completely untrustworthy.
Intermediate values indicate the relative trustworthiness of CAs, but are not an
absolute measurement of trust. We are not aware of such an absolute metric.
Previous authors have devised trust metrics, based for example, on the number
of positive experiences with the person (Beth, Borcherding and Klein, 1994),
the length of the certification path (Tarah and Huitema, 1992), and how much
you trust a key holder to act as a trusted introducer (Network Associates,
1999). Reiter and Stubblebine (1997) found none of these methods to be fully
satisfactory, and so proposed a metric based on the monetary insurance value
that a relying party could recover if the name to key binding proved to be
incorrect. In fact, Chokani and Ford suggest that liability is just one of many
factors that should be documented in a CP/CPS. We give reasons below why we
believe that an absolute metric cannot exist. For this reason, the ability that
expert system technology provides to explore its knowledge is considered vital
in such an application.
In this paper we describe the expert system and the issues we had to address
as we developed it. Two main issues were encountered. One is that the
mapping between the knowledge level of human trust and beliefs to the
symbol level of knowledge representation is not always straightforward. Yet we
found ways to clarify the steps involved and discovered four main types of
mapping that seem important. The second relates to the use of questionnaires
during knowledge acquisition.
1.3. What is Trust?
There has long been a difficulty in establishing a clear definition of the
concept of trust. Personality psychologists, social psychologists and
economists all have different perceptions of the meaning of trust. A very clear
exposition of the study of trust and its different meanings is given in
(Battacharya, Devinney and Pillutla, 1998). Briefly, personality psychologists
view trust as a personality trait, social psychologists view trust as an
expectation about the behaviour of others, whilst economists focus on the costs
and benefits of exercising trust in business relationships. Our expert system
most nearly corresponds to the social psychologists' viewpoint, in that the trust
quotient computed by it provides the user with an expectation or belief about
the behaviour of the CA, when it is producing public key certificates.
The trust quotient is thus a measure of the quality of the procedures and
policy described in a CP/CPS, and thus might be taken to be a measure of the
authenticity of a digitally signed message received by a user. Each user will
then interpret the trust quotient differently, depending upon his
predisposition to trust others (i.e. his personality trait), and the importance of
the message that he has received (the economic factors). We do note however
in Section 6, that the trust quotient produced will in part reflect the
personality trait of the user, since many of the questions posed by the expert
system require judgement. For example, if our expert system produces a trust
quotient of 0.7 for a given CA, a trusting user might view this value as
sufficient for his purposes, and accept the digitally signed message as
authentic, whereas a less trusting user might view the digitally signed
message with some scepticism. (But note that the less trusting user may gain
a score of 0.6 for the same CA due to the way he has judged the adequacey of
the CA's procedures.) Alternatively, the same user might trust two messages
from the same recipient differently, if one is for a large transaction and the
other is for a small one. Finally, the same user might trust the same
transaction message from the same recipient differently, if it is the first time
such a message arrived, or if it is the nth time he has seen such a message.
Thus our expert system is designed to be a tool to help the user in his trust
decision making, rather than being a tool designed to replace the user's
decision making by saying categorically that messages should be trusted or
not.
Relating this to e-commerce, in order to carry out an e-commerce transaction,
a user needs to be both authenticated and authorised. Authentication provides
assurance that the user is who he says he is, whilst authorisation says that this
particular user is allowed to carry out the expected tasks. Our expert system
provides some measure of the trustworthiness of the authentication of the
user, but says nothing about the authorisation of the user. Even within the
scope of authentication, a further issue is raised: the CPS and CP might not
accurately reflect what the CA actually does in practice. Sometimes the CA
performs better, sometimes worse. For example, it might be stated that lists of
revoked certificates will be updated every 24 hours, whereas slack procedures
might lengthen this to several days. In this case, the relying party who waits
24 hours before checking the lists to ensure the sender's certificate is still
valid, might be at risk without knowing it. The expert system described here
only takes account of the published CP/CPS, and not the actual working
practices of the CA. But we have recognised this problem and have developed
the system further so that it can assess actual, rather than stated, practice. A
description of this can be found in (Ball, Chadwick and Basden, in
submission).
2. OVERVIEW OF ISTAR
The KBS software we adapted for use as a knowledge server was Istar (Basden
and Brown, 1996), first developed during the INCA project (Basden, Brown,
Tetlow and Hibberd, 1996) which aimed at intelligent authoring of
construction contracts. Istar was designed as a flexible visual programming
language, employing a 'language' of boxes (nodes) and arrows (arcs) with
which the knowledge engineer draws knowledge as a graph rather than
writing it as production rules or predicates. This approach is particularly
useful for building KBs in ill structured domains of knowledge (Basden and
Hibberd, 1996). In the INCA project this enabled the development of a
substantial KB was produced which created construction contracts for the
user according to the needs of the parties and their specific situation (Hibberd
and Basden, 1995).
Istar's inference engine is based on the concept of the inference session with
the user, during which is repeats a cycle of backward chaining to find
questions to ask, seeking the answer to these question, and forward chaining
to propagate these answers. See Fig. 1.
Istar Inference Engine
Fig. 1. The Istar Inference Engine
The modular architecture of Istar's engine has allowed it to be extended to
seek answers to the questions from across the Internet as well as from local
users. This can be in either client or server mode. In client mode, Istar seeks
information from servers such as web pages or, as discussed towards the end
of this paper, from our Trust Check Server. In server mode, Istar sends
dynamically generated HTML pages to a client and awaits their answers.
Istar's server mode is described in Basden (2000). Istar has a multi-threaded
capability and so can run in all three modes at one time, over several
concurrent knowledge bases. It is this that makes it an ideal vehicle for
hosting a trust assessment KBS, in that the expertise in the KBS can be made
available worldwide via the Internet, accessible by any number of users who
have browsers.
The internal structure of the Istar knowledge base is similar to a semantic net,
in which items are linked by relationships in a flexible manner. Attributes can
also be linked, by inference relationships, and each such attribute has a value
type (Boolean, Probability, Bayesian, Integer, Float, String, etc.) and an
inference method (such as AND, OR, Probabilistic And, Probabilistic Or,
Maximum, Minimum, Bayesian Accumulation of Evidence, etc.). The range of
legal values that an attribute can take depends on their type, and most can
also take the special value 'Unknown'. The whole KB is composed of these
attributes and the relationships between them. Inference relationships form a
directed acyclic graph and Istar prevents any loops being formed therein.
One or more attributes are chosen to be the goals in an inference session, and
attributes with no antecedents are those selected by the backward chaining
process to be asked as questions. The ordering in which questions are asked is
determined by the backward chaining process, which suppresses those that
are irrelevant, and by special inference methods. One of these is FirstKnown,
which will take the first antecedent that is given a Known value and is used to
allow the user to answer "I don't know; try to work it out by other means." The
latter is employed in the trust assessment KBS to allow the user the option of
overriding the KBS's own calculations with their own judgements in specific
circumstances.
Istar provides a number of mechanisms to give help and explanation to the
user. One is a set of help texts that is available with each question, and are
used variously to explain what the concept behind the question is, how to
answer it, what its critical values are, and also which sections of Chokani and
Ford, if any, refer to it, so that the user has access to the source material if
they wish. The other help mechanism is that the knowledge base can be
explored. In local mode, powerful facilities exist to display connected portions
of the KB, such as a nodes complete antecedent network, and to search for
items of interest. In server mode, in which the information has to be
transmitted via web pages, exploration is textual, step by step, rather than
visual: the user can click on the goals to find their antecedent attributes, then
on these to find their antecedents in turn, and so on. See Fig. 2 for an example
of such pages.
 Fig. 2. Example of Simple Exploration of Knowledge
 
The user can engage in 'what-iffing', in which they supply different answers to
questions to see what happens to the final results. In server mode, this is
accomplished by means of a 'Reset' button during exploration, after which the
backward chaining process automatically asks that question afresh if it is
appropriate to do so.
3. OVERVIEW OF THE TRUST MODEL
The overall goal of the trust model is to calculate a trust quotient, a numeric
measure that indicates to what extent experts would consider that it is likely
that a CA can be relied upon to provide good authentication of a user and
produce a trusted identity to public key binding. The model has been
implemented as an Istar knowledge base, shown in inference net form in Fig.
3 (an actual screen grab from Istar). In this diagram, boxes express items or
variables of various kinds, and most have labels that identify their meaning,
and links between represent inference relationships (solid links) or grouping
(dashed links). There are also small dark boxes; these are ancillary variables
that have little knowledge level meaning (see below) and are in the KB merely
to aid in the necessary calculations. The reader is not expected to read the
writing in Fig. x1, which is, of necessity, small; explanations will be given
below where necessary.
(new version to be procured)
Fig. 3. The Trust Assessment Knowledge Base (new vsn needed)
In Fig 3, inference flows from left to right. The main goal is a single item, 'Can
Trust', with an auxiliary inverse goal, 'Can't Trust', shown at the right hand
side. The input questions are ranged on the left half of the diagram, and are
those that either have no antecedents or are grouped (dashed links).
We have taken as a starting point for building the expert system the work of
Chokani and Ford (1999). This describes the procedures that a CA must carry
out and also a standard template for the description of these procedures in a
CPS or CP. From here seven areas have been identified as being important to








The nodes for these are those major ones that link into the 'Trust' node,
ignoring any of the ancillary ones. Briefly, identification is concerned with the
process of identifying the subject who has applied for a public key certificate.
The legal section is concerned with the various legal provisions between the
CA and the relying party, such as warranties, disclaimers and indemnities.
Obligations describes the obligations of the various parties, one to another, for
example, the subject is obliged to keep his private key secure so that no-one
else can use it (otherwise masquerade would ensue). Procedures concerns the
various internal procedures that a CA must perform, such as key management
and staff training and recruitment. Cryptography is concerned with the
strength and quality of the cryptographic functions being used by the CA, the
implication being that if the cryptography is weak, forged certificates can be
produced. Malpractice is concerned with the controls that are in place in
order to stop wrong doing from occurring, such as physical and network
security controls, audit trails and archives. Finally the audit section enquires
about the external audit that the CA subjects itself to.
These seven factors are, themselves, derived from others, placed somewhat to
their left in Fig. 3, which are, in turn, derived from yet others, and so on until
we reach questions that can be put to the user. These are the questions that
are put to the user during a run in which a given CA is being evaluated, and
the user is expected to answer them by reference to the text of the CPS or
from other sources of information, such as phoning the CA itself or from
informal information or rumours.
Most links have weightings. Those towards the output (right hand) side -
representing the seven main factors to CA Trustworthiness - are the most
important and interviews with experts have been carried out to obtain them.
Weightings of links to the left of these seven main factors are less important
because their effect is moderated by the flow of inference towards the goal.
Most of the input side weightings have been set by expertise from within the
research team or by asking a small number of recognised experts.
Apart from ancillary nodes, the variables each have some conceptual meaning
in the realm of authentication trust. This enables us to link beliefs about this
realm with variables that Istar can manipulate to yield a final trust quotient.
What the form of this relationship is, and the diverse methods that have been
employed in the KB to effect such manipulation, is now discussed.
4. THE VARIABLES AND INFERENCEMETHODS
Istar offers a number of types of variable and, for each, a number of standard
inference methods. The main types employed in the trust KB are Booleans,
Probabilities, Bayesians and Floats. This section explains and discusses the
choice of types of variable and of inference methods, in terms of how concepts
related to trust must be combined.
4.1 The Precise Use of Variables
Loosely speaking, when the user engages in a session with the trust KB, they
enter their beliefs about various factors they are asked about. These beliefs
are processed by the KB and then a result is given which is a belief about the
trustworthiness of the CA. However, this view, which talks only about beliefs,
leads to confusion. We must be more precise.
Under Newell and Simon's (1976) Physical Symbol Systems Hypothesis a
computer is capable of intelligent action as long as it can process symbols.
However, Newell (1982) extended this with the publication of his paper, The
Knowledge Level, which proposed that what the symbols referred to is a realm
or 'level' that is distinct from that of symbols. While symbolic computation is
carried out at the symbol level, human thinking has an important knowledge
level meaning, with which the symbols refer to something. We must be precise
in understanding and maintaining the distinction between the symbol and
what it refers to, lest confusion occurs.
In the case of the trust KB most of its variables stand for a human belief about
a concept relevant to trust. When the user engages with the KBS to evaluate a
given CPS, several steps are undertaken, some at the knowledge level, some at
the symbol level, and some translating between the two levels:
Step 1, SL: During the run, the user is asked questions, which take the
form of a short text displayed on the screen. The text itself is a symbol,
and is chosen by the action of the symbol level algorithms of the
inference engine and the symbol level structures in the KB, by
mechanisms described briefly in an earlier section.
Step 2, SL-KL: The user reads the text and translates it into knowledge
level meaning by the normal processes of linguistic interpretation. It is, in
most cases, a request for information.
Step 3, KL: The user, working at the knowledge level, obtains the
information they believe has been requested. This can be by reading the
CPS, and in some cases the relevant information is clearly stated therein,
while in others some interpretation of the meaning of the CPS is required
and perhaps even a phone call must be made to the CA to obtain more
detailed information or interpretations.
Step 4, KL-SL: The user decides how the information they have obtained
might best be represented in the symbolic form expected by the KBS. In
the case of a Boolean tick box, this might be a relatively simple decision,
but in the case of a number being expected, the user must set a slider,
and must therefore decide where to set it. Sliders are used, where the
user is making their own judgement about the quality of, for example, the
CA's approach to disclaimers. If the user considers that the quality to be
very high, then they must decide whether to place the slider at 95, 90,
80, or whatever they believe to be appropriate. We discuss this issue in
the subsection 'User Input Interpretation'.
Step 5, SL: The KBS, having received a number or a truth value now
propagates it throughout the KB, and seeks the next question to ask. If
one it found, then it iterates back to step 1 above. If not, it continues with
the remaining steps below.
Step 6, SL: Once all relevant and necessary questions have been asked
and answered, a result is available, which is a number between 0 and 1.
The KBS displays this as a slider or as a number scaled up to be in the
range 0 to 100.
Step 7, SL-KL: The user reads this number and interprets it as a belief in
the trustworthiness of the CPS.
Step 8, KL: The user decides what to do about this degree of belief. In
most cases where the KBS is used as a prelude to action, some
commitment to appropriate action is made. What such actions might be is
discussed in the section 'Uses of the KBS'. But in some cases the
commitment is deferred because the result from the KBS is not
conclusive, neither for trust nor for distrust. In this case, the user
employs Istar's facilities to explore the knowledge and the reasons it has
come to the result it has given. This is discussed in the section
'Interpretation of Result'.
It is clear that an awareness of all parts of this process must guide all parts of
the design of the KBS, from the selection of variables in the KB, through the
choice of inference methods, to the text to be placed on the screen when
questions are asked or results given. Which types of variable might be chosen
is dictated by what Istar offers and by what is easy for the user to use.
4.2 User Input Interpretation
While the option existed to require the user to enter precise numbers or text,
it was decided that it would be more appropriate, as well as easier to use, if
they were required to merely click tick boxes or drag sliders. The use of
sliders is not only more convenient (with a mouse) but more appropriate than
entering numerical digits because the element of judgement required of the
user in undertaking steps 2 to 4 above makes high precision numerical input
unnecessary and can even be misleading to the user.
With a tick box the user has merely to decide whether the proposition
contained in the question is true or false. In most cases the interpretation
required is straightforward. Where it is not, such as when the information is
not available or if it is not clear from the available information sources, the
user has the option of entering 'Unknown' as their answer.
With a slider, which is used to express either some degree of belief or some
degree of quality, the interpretation is more complex. Degrees of quality, such
as embodied in the question
"To what extent does the CPS deal with disclaimers and exclusions
adequately?"
invite a judgement by its very wording, and the user will normally treat the
slider as though it were a continuous Likert scale rather than a precise
number. In the case of a degree of belief that a state pertains, an event has
happened or an event will happen, however, the situation is more complex.
These cases are akin to probabilities, but human beings are notoriously poor at
handling numerical probabilities, especially concerning rare events or states.
Typically, if a user intends to convey that a probability is low, they will enter a
figure of 0.1 or 0.05. But if the average probability is lower than this, then the
effect of the figure they have entered will be the very opposite of what they
intended, namely to increase the probability above that of the average rather
than to decrease it.
For this reason, it has been commonplace for some years in KBS technology to
move away from asking the user to give numerical probabilities. Instead, they
are asked to give a certainty factor, perhaps ranging from -5 through 0 to +5.
This is translated into a number for internal use via a mapping such that -5
maps to 0, 0 maps to the average or a priori probability, and +5 maps to 1. In
Istar this mapping is by a piecewise linear curve, shown in Fig. 4.
Cert Factor to Prob
Fig. 4. Mapping of User's Input Quantity to Internal Number.
4.3 Interpretation of Result
As an initial result, in step 6, the user is given a single trust quotient, a
quantity which is intended to indicate a degree of trustworthiness ranging
from none to total. Internally, this is a number ranging from 0 to 1, but it is
presented to the user in three alternative ways, depending on the mode in
which Istar is used: as a number ranging from 0 to 100, as a visual symbol in a
diagram of a line of variable length, or as a visual symbol in text of a line of
asterisks.
As discussed above, the result is of calculations made largely under the social
perspective on trust, and does not take into account the personality or
economic perspectives. In the extreme cases, of very low or very high quotient,
then the interpretation - steps 7 and 8 above - is usually clear: either
commitment to accept or commitment to reject. In less extreme cases,
interpretation of the result will depend on the application of the other two
types of trust. If the user is a generally trusting person and the outcome of
misplaced trust is not critical, then a degree of trust as low as 0.5 might be
deemed satisfactory. On the other hand, if the user is of a generally paranoid
type, or the outcome of misplaced trust would be highly damaging, such as in
some military applications, then a trust quotient of even 0.98 might be
deemed too low.
There is often a range in which the quotient will lie between those on which
the user makes a commitment of trust or distrust. When the result lies in this
range, the interpretation made by the user can be more complex, involving
further exploration of the basis for the result. When accessed via a web
browser Istar allows the user to work backwards from the goal variable, one
step of inference at a time, listing at each step those variables that have
contributed to the step of inference. When the inference method of any
variable is something akin to AND or OR, then there might be just one factor
that has given, respectively, a low or high value to the variable.
Such factors can be explored further, as dictated by the user's precise
requirements or concerns about trust. The offending factors might be ones
that the user reckons are unimportant because of special characteristics of
their situation, or they might be factors about which the user has some
control. In such cases, the user can, as part of their interpretation, make a
decision to ignore these factors and commit to trust. Conversely, the user
might find, during their exploration that an apparently high quotient is not
valid in their particular situation. In addition to such interpretation, exploring
the KBS in this way can indicate areas in which managerial action might be
required; in this way the KBS can become a decision support tool in addition to
being a mere evaluator of trust. Such uses are discussed further in 'Uses of the
Trust Assessment KBS'.
Thus, we find that interpretation of the result, that takes place at step 8 above,
is seldom a simple process of deciding whether the quotient exceeds some
limit or not. For this reason, while use could be made of this KBS in the role of
an intelligent agent to filter out untrustworthy Internet messages, its main use
is likely to be more in the realms of support of human interpretation by
adding the value of expert knowledge.
4.4 Internal Variables, Inference Methods and Weights
Between the KL-SL translation involved in user input interpretation and the
SL-KL translation involved in interpretation of result, the KBS undertakes
considerable SL processing of variables. As can be seen from the description of
the model above, there are many internal variables, each with its own
inference method and ability to hold a value. Just as the input and result
variables all carry some human meaning that the user must add by the process
of interpretation in steps 2, 4 and 7 above, so most internal variables also carry
some human meaning. Their meaning was assigned by the designer of the KB,
and their values can be interpreted as has been described above. Such
variables are presented to the user during exploration of the result.
Because of these KL meanings, each internal variable must have an inference
method suited to that meaning. In this section we explain and discuss the
types of inference method we have found it important to use. An inference
method is an algorithm that undertakes some calculation and the resulting
value is placed in its consequent variable. The calculation is performed on the
basis of the values in a number of antecedent variables. The inference method
for each consequent variable is chosen by the knowledge engineer during the
KB design. Since most inference methods imply a certain type of consequent
variable, the type of variable limits the range of methods that can be chosen
for it. In Istar, the following main inference methods are available for the
following types of variable:
BOOLEAN variable: AND, OR, and also a number involving a predicate
over the antecedents such as 'First antecedent greater than all the
others'.
Number variable (INTEGER or FLOATing point): Add, subtract, multiply,
divide, mean, maximum, minimum, and also a number that count for how
many of the antecedents a certain predicate like 'greater than' is true.
PROBABILITY variable: ProbAnd (result = pA * pB * ...), ProbOr (pA + pB
- pA * pB), maximum, minimum, and various predicate-related methods.
BAYESIAN variable: This is a PROBABILITY which has an additional
a-priori probability which is its starting point when collecting evidence.
All the probability inference methods, plus Bayesian accumulation of
evidence.
(Other variables include things like proportions, rational numbers, odds,
directions (angles), OZMOs (one-zero-minus-one such as needed for sine),
strings, etc. These are not much used in the Trust Assessment KB and so will
not be discussed here. All types of variable and inference method are outlined
in Basden and Brown (1996) and online web pages (Istar 1,2) displays the
current set.)
It should be noted that the use of the name 'Probability' for a variable type is
something of a misnomer. Strictly, 'probability' is a knowledge level
phenomenon, by which human beings bring together into a single concept
some statistical knowledge of a set of events or states or objects. That which is
known in Istar as 'Probability' is, strictly, a degree between 0 and 1. It is called
'Probability' because both the variable type and also the inference methods
associated with the type happen to be useful when processing probabilities. In
this text we will use the upper case 'PROBABILITY' to mean the numeric
symbol in Istar that can be used to denote some degree, and the lower case
'probability' to mean the knowledge level statistic. Thus a PROBABILITY in
Istar can often be used to represent a probability, but in the Trust Assessment
KB it is mainly used to represent a degree of (human) belief.
In addition to types of variable and inference methods, Istar allows most
inference relationships to carry unary operators and weightings. A unary
operator performs some operation on the value found in the antecedent
variable before it is used in the inference method. The weighting is a
parameter used in the unary operation. Some common unary operations
offered by Istar include:
Direct: No change in value.
Negate (no parameter): For a numeric antecedent, the value used in
inference is the negative of that found in the antecedent. For a BOOLEAN
antecedent the value is the opposite of the truth value of the antecedent.
For a PROBABILITY or BAYESIAN antecedent the value used is one minus
the value in the antecedent.
Scale, Shrink: The value of a numeric antecedent is multiplied or divided
by the value found in the weight.
ProbAnd: The value of the PROBABILITY or BAYESIAN antecedent is
multiplied (reduced) by the PROBABILITY value found in the weight.
ProbOr: The value of the PROBABILITY or BAYESIAN antecedent is
increased by the PROBABILITY value found in the weight in accordance
with the arithmetic for probabilistic OR.
BayesianWeight: The weight is used in the Bayesian inference method
described below.
Many others are available, some described in Basden and Brown (1996), and
the full current list available on a web page (Istar, 3).
4.5 Mapping KL Combinations to SL Inference Methods
Not only is there a mapping from KL concepts to SL variables, but there is also
a mapping from KL combinations of beliefs into SL inference methods. For
each SL variable in the KB the inference method must be selected to match
what happens at the KL. In some cases the inference methods offered by Istar
match KL combinations well, in some cases they match approximately, while
in at least one case none of the available inference methods were sufficient
and one had to be constructed via numeric arithmetic employing floating point
numbers (see section 4.5.4) In most cases the KL combination required that
unary operators and weights were assigned to the antecedent relationships in
order to achieve the effects desired.
The process by which the SL inference methods, unary operators and weights
were selected was as follows. First, the sufficiency and necessity of the KL
antecedent concepts was examined, and the result of this would often suggest
which SL inference method was most appropriate. Then the precise effect of
the SL inference method was simulated (mentally or in Istar by building a trial
inference step) and this was compared with what was desired at the
knowledge level. Finally, where this was not appropriate, unary operators and
weights were assigned to the SL antecedent relationships in order to bring the
effect of the inference method more in line with the effect desired at the
knowledge level.
It should be noted that, when selecting SL inference methods by which to
implement the KL combinations, because there is an element of variability and
uncertainty inherent in the interpretation processes in steps 2, 4 and 7, it is
not essential for the parameters of the inference method or of the unary
operators to be precise. What is important is the overall shape and behaviour
of the curve that describes how the value of the consequent varies with that of
the antecedents.
We found four KL combinations to be important. Some tend to be useful in
combining the input from questions, others in the central portion of the KB
while a special combination, which we call 'penalty', was required at the
output end of the KB to combine all the major factors together into a single
trust quotient. Those nearer the output have a greater effect than those nearer
the input. We now discuss these and how we implemented them using Istar's
facilities, under names that reflect their KL meaning rather than their SL
algorithmic implementation. A graph for each is shown in Fig. 5
graphs not yet done
Fig. 5. Graphs of the Four KL Combinations.
4.5.1 Belt and Braces
At the KL we recognised that some antecedents build upon each other and
asymptotically increase the amount of trust one has in the consequent until
complete trust is attained (i.e. 1 at the SL). The absence of one antecedent
does not decrease one's trust in the other antecedents that are present, whilst
the presence of two antecedents rather than one increases but does not double
the trust. The more antecedents that are true, the better, but the effect of
each reduces as the consequent approaches unity. (Note that a value of 1.0
can never fully be reached in practice, no matter how many antecedents there
are, since it is always possible, however rare, for trust to be misplaced.) We
called this combinatorial method "belt and braces", the analogy being that a
person who progressively increases the amount of support for his trousers
(belt, buttons, braces, clips etc.) will become more trusting that they will not
fall down. Never the less the possibility still exists that under some extreme
conditions the trousers may fall down, so a value of 1.0 is never attained.
An example of this combinatorial method is used in the process of identifying
(the name of) a person. Sixteen methods were recognised in our system e.g.
passport, credit card, fingerprint, utility bill, photo ID card, bank reference
etc. and the more of these a person presents, the more trust one can have in
the identification.
'Belt and Braces' is similar to probabilistic OR, in that the effects of the
antecedents combine in an asymptotic fashion. Consequently, Istar's ProbOr
method was deemed appropriate for this combination, the more so since one
could, in many cases, argue that the combination should indeed be one of
independent probabilities that certain states were true. For example, each
identification method has a certain probability that the identity will be
mistaken, and the methods are largely independent of each other. So the
probability of mistaken identification when employing two or more methods is
reasonably accurately given by probabilistic OR.
However, few of the variables in the KB were actually mapped, strictly, to
probabilities. Rather, most were simply degrees of quality. There are several
reasons for this. One is that in cases of extremely low or high probability,
other extraneous factors are likely to pull the extreme value towards the
centre. For example, the probability of mistaken identity using a fingerprint
might be deemed to be 1 in 6 billion, hence a reliability figure of 0.99999984
(since it is assumed that fingerprints are unique across the population of the
world). But the likelihood of mistaken identity is in fact much larger than this,
owing to the possibility of errors occurring in the taking, storing, matching
and interpretation of fingerprints.
But some modification is needed to this combinatorial method, because not all
of the antecedents will have the same weight or effect. Therefore, in 'Belt and
Braces', we gave each antecedent a ProbAnd unary operator and an attendant
weight that was used to reduce the degree value of the antecedent before it
was used in the ProbOr inference method. For example, a bank reference is
less reliable than a passport, which is less reliable than a fingerprint, and the
three were given weights of 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 respectively, so that if a bank
reference is presented, its contribution to the consequent would be only 0.7,
while the contribution of a fingerprint would be 0.9. This gave the desired
effect, that CAs that employ fingerprints could achieve high reliability of
identification without any other method, but that using bank references alone
gave a much lower reliability. The weights given to each identification method
were obtained by interviewing a number of security experts (see section 5).
Belt and braces was used for combing a number of different nodes in the KBS,
for example: organisation authentication methods and the damages covered in
a CPS.
4.5.2 Paranoid
The inverse of "Belt and Braces" at the KL we termed paranoid. With paranoid
combinations, we need all antecedents to be of high quality for trust to be
high. If a single antecedent is of low quality or zero value, trust rapidly
decreases. Low quality of several antecedents decreases trust even more, but
each time a low quality antecedent is added, it has less and less impact on the
consequent value. Trust therefore decreases exponentially with the number of
missing or low quality antecedents. We used this combinatorial method for
example, on the factors that comprise the compliance audit i.e. list of
compliance topics, qualifications of the auditor, frequency of audit etc. If any
one audit item was absent or low quality, our trust in the audit would decrease
substantially.
'Paranoid' is implemented by Istar's ProbAnd inference method. ProbAnd
achieves the desired effect, in that as more and more antecedents depart from
perfect quality, the consequent reduces towards zero.
Again, a simple probabilistic AND is not appropriate on its own, in that if a
single antecedent were answered with a 'No' (zero quality factor) then the
consequent would be zero, and all the other antecedents would have no effect.
So the antecedents must be weighted so that some have less of this reducing
effect than do others. They were all given a ProbOr unary operator and a
weight that reflected by how much each antecedent could reduce the degree
of the consequent on its own. In this way, no single antecedent can reduce the
consequent to zero on its own. The weighting of the various items was
determined by interviewing a number of experts, and is fully described in
(Chadwick, and Basden, in publication).
The paranoid combination method was used on a significant number of the KB
nodes, for example: the audit trail, the various obligations of the various
parties, and key generation.
4.5.3 For and Against
This KL combination method is conceptually midway between "Belt and
Braces" and "Paranoid". All antecedents are considered, and contribute
towards the overall trust. If an antecedent is present and of high quality, it has
a positive contribution to the consequent value, whilst if it is low quality or
missing (zero value) it negatively impacts on the consequent value. This
combination is suited to evidential reasoning. At the SL, Bayesian
accumulation algorithms are used to combine the antecedents. 'For and
Against' starts somewhere in the middle (at an a-priori value which can be
defined) and antecedents may pull the consequent value down as well as up.
The method is implemented by Istar's Bayesian inference method, which
undertakes a simple form of Bayesian accumulation of evidence similar to that
used by early expert systems (Duda, Hart and Nilsson, 1976). The central idea
is to work with odds ratios which are equivalent to the 0-1 degree (probability)
according to the formula:
O = P / (1 - P)
where P is the degree (treated as a probability) and O is the equivalent odds.
The consequent starts with an a-priori value, Pc0, which is converted into
odds, Oc0, and this is them multiplied by a weighting, Wi, for each
antecedent.
The weight of the antecedent varies according to two weight figures on the
inference relationship, which correspond to the logical sufficiency (LS) and
logical necessity (LN) of the antecedent as evidence, together with the actual
value of the antecedent variable, Pa, and whether this value is above or below
its own a-priori value, Pa0, such that the weight, W, corresponding to an
antecedent value, Pa, is given in Table x2. For positive evidence, LS is greater
than unity and LN is less, while for negative evidence it is the other way round.
Table x2. Conversion of Antecedent Value to Weight
Pa W
0 LN
Between 0 and Pa0 Between LN and 1.0 
Pa0 1.0 
Between Pa0 and 1 Between 1.0 and LS 
1.0 LS 
In Istar the curve is piecewise linear, but a smoother curve might be
preferable, probably of a logarithmic nature, such that its slope is continuous
at the a-priori.
Only those weights are multiplied with Oc whose antecedents have a known
value. After all antecedents are accumulated in this manner, Oc is then
converted back into a degree between 0 and 1 by the formula (Oc / (1 + Oc)).
For symmetric evidence LS is the inverse of LN, but by controlling these values
idependently, the effect of the antecedent can become highly asymmetric,
approaching, in the extremes, the behaviour of either the paranoid or belt and
braces. Thus this method provides a wide range of control, and is employed in
a small number of variables in the middle of the inference net.
4.5.4 Penalty
The 'Penalty' method is employed for the final stage of the KB, when the values
of all variables that represent the major trust factors are combined to produce
the single figure that is the trust quotient. With inference of the type used
here, the nearer to the goal variable, the more important it is that the shape of
the curve is correct.
Several inference methods were considered for this. One was the simple
ProbAnd, on the grounds that if any of the major factors were missing we
should be 'paranoid' about it. This was the inference method employed in the
earlier versions of the KB but it tended to penalise too heavily when factors
were near unity (since there were seven factors, if each of them had a score of
0.9, the final trust quotient would end up approximately at 0.4) while it did
not penalise low valued factors heavily enough.
Conceptually we wanted a curve with a discontinuity in it, as shown in Fig. 5d.
This allows us to penalise antecedents that drop below some threshold value.
Initially there should be a gentle fall in the consequent trust value, caused by
one or more of the antecedents falling from perfect quality but still remaining
high quality (e.g. 1.0 down to 0.9). However, at some point there should be a
discontinuity, when the consequent trust drops dramatically, caused by one of
the antecedents falling below its acceptable threshold value. This has the
desired effect of not penalising high quality factors, whilst penalising low
quality factors.
We considered using Bayesian Belief Networks (Hackermann and Wellman,
1995, Fung and Favero, 1995), in which the combination algorithm is
controlled by a table. In theory, this should give a greater control over the
shape of the curve than the simple Bayesian algorithm offered as standard by
Istar, and should be more appropriate when the antecedents are not
independent. The BBN table contains multiplication coefficients which are
used in the calculation, one coefficient for each possible combination of
antecedents taking values of either 0 or 1 (false or true). For example, suppose
trust were to depend on only two antecedent factors, Cryptography and
Procedures, which are represented as variables C and P, each of which can







Then, the algorithm to combine the actual values of P and C is:
0.96*P*C + 0.62*(1-P)*C + 0.71*P*(1-C) + 0.1*(1-P)*(1-C)
In this way, both the low and the high values of both P and C have an effect,
and the amount of the effect can be controlled by the coefficients in the table.
Each stage of inference has its own table of coefficients.
Although the BBN is easily demonstrated for a small network, as above, the
problems of calculating the required coefficient tables become severe when
the number of inputs to a node becomes large. Seven antecedents requires a
table with 128 entries. Elsewhere in the model nodes with 10 antecedents are
found, giving rise to tables with 1024 entries. Whilst the storage of such tables
is not a problem, the calculation of the values to put in them is a difficult
problem, the magnitude of each coefficient having to be found by asking
experts. Not only is this time-consuming, but there is a more fundamental
difficulty, even for relatively small tables. Some combinations of antecedents
are so rare that the expert can do little more than guess at what the figure
should be. Moreover, exploration with small BBNs has also shown that the
trust values calculated do not accord well with expected values. With a large
table, the effect of any one antecedent is swamped by the others, so it is
difficult for any one antecedent to have a large penalty effect. Setting
coefficients specifically to achieve this for one antecedent tends to upset the
balance of the table for others.
These problems led us to the algorithm currently implemented for this stage
of inference, which, at the SL, we might call the Weighted Accumulation
Threshold Algorithm. In this algorithm, the value of the consequent is derived
from two opposing tendencies: a positive tendency which is the sum of the
antecedent values and a negative penalty tendency which comes into play if
any of the antecedents are below some threshold value. Each of the
antecedents has two parameters, a weight which is used in the positive
tendency and a threshold figure which dictates when its value is low enough to
exert a penalty influence. The positive tendency is the weighted sum of all the
antecedent values (the sum of the weights of all antecedents is unity). This is
multiplied by the penalty factor, which is the product of all those antecedent
values that are below their individual thresholds. In this way, if an input is
greater than its threshold it contributes directly to a weighted average of
trust, but if it is below its threshold it reduces the trust level even more than
its contribution to the weighted average, eventually reducing he trust to zero.
This algorithm has the advantage that it is easy to apply the experts
weightings of the contributions, and it reflects at the knowledge level the way
trust is expected to depend on its major factors. The most difficult issues that
we were left to decide were the threshold values for each of the antecedents.
Ideally these should have been chosen by the experts during our interviews,
but we had already finished them when we realised that they were needed. We
thus used our own expertise to chose sensible values. Mathematically the
output (consequent) value of a node is given by:
equation
Where Ik is an input (antecedent) value, Wk is its weight, Tk is its threshold
value and H() is the unit step function. Fig. 6 shows outputs from the function
for threshold values of 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8, where the weight is
plot of WTF
Fig. 6. Actual Plot of Penalty Function
5. KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION
In the main, the knowledge acquisition process followed normal practice. It is
described in detail in (Chadwick and Basden, in publication), and we merely
highlight the main points here, but we then discuss one issue that emerged
that is of more general importance.
5.1 Overview of the Process
There were two main stages in constructing the KB: first, the overall structure
was gained by selecting knowledge from a comprehensive published source
(Chokhani and Ford, 1999), then the weights of evidence were elicited from
leading experts in the field. What our experience in accomplishing this has
demonstrated is that the second stage is far from simple, and can usefully be
broken down into several steps, each with a distinct purpose.
Chokani and Ford (1999) contains a detailed description of the issues a CA
must take into account, and is widely accepted as authoritative. We extracted
the issues that were relevant to trust and implemented them as the first
prototype KB. It emerged that the KB has a tree-like structure, which was not
surprising since Chokani and Ford had presented their knowledge in this
form.
In stage 2 knowledge was elicited from domain experts. When compared with
some KBS projects, it is perhaps remarkable that the overall structure of the
KB underwent so little modification during stage 2. This evidences the high
quality of the original source. For those projects that involve similar high
quality sources, the main contribution of domain experts is to supply what the
initial knowledge source could not, namely knowledge that is affected by
context and use in real life problem solving (Attarwala and Basden, 1985),
such as weights of evidence links and many small, though extremely
important, refinements.
Thus stage 2 comprised a series of interviews with leading experts in the PKI
field, using questionnaires. The questionnaires largely followed the internal
structure of the KB and asked the respondents to comment on relative
importance of various factors for some or all links in that structure. As the
factors were quite different in many cases, it was a difficult task to perform,
and was perhaps analogous to asking gourmets to place a value on the
different fruits in a fruit salad. Four different questionnaires were produced
during the research: a pilot questionnaire, followed by versions 1, 2 and 3. The
pilot questionnaire, attempted with two experts, asked questions about every
node in the graph but it proved too large and cumbersome to use.
(Nevertheless, this exercise yielded valuable knowledge that was employed in
building the KB.) Version 1 removed the least significant questions and
concentrated on the later nodes in the graph that would go towards
calculating the final trust quotient. But we found that the concepts were
sometimes difficult to explain or elicit answers on, perhaps because some of
the questions were worded ambiguously, or a context for thought had not been
established prior to asking the question. Version 2 added a number of
questions designed to get the respondents thinking about the relevant issues
and setting a context, before asking them to weight the various aspects of
trust against each other. This version, the penultimate, was completed by the
most experts and was the one used to populate most of the variables and
relationships in our knowledge base. It highlighted one or two areas where we
did not have an optimal design for the KBS, with one or two questions out of
place and a misplaced arc. These were subsequently corrected, to produce
version 3, which was used in the last few interviews. The time to complete a
questionnaire fell from 4 hours for the pilot to 1.5 hours for the final versions,
which is more acceptable to busy domain experts.
5.2 Some General Issues in Knowledge Acquisition
In the above we can detect several distinct issues that might need to be
addressed whenever questionnaires are employed for interviews in this
manner:
1. Generating the initial questionnaire. That the pilot questionnaires
could provide any useful knowledge at all suggests that an effective way
of formulating questionnaires is to derive them from the structure of the
KB. (This however is likely to be the case only once the KB has reached a
certain degree of accuracy, otherwise most of the interview time would be
taken up with the expert trying to 're-educate' the interviewer.)
2. Identifying the important domain issues. In such a questionnaire some
questions will always be more important that others. Which these are
cannot always be known beforehand, so there is likely to be a step in the
interview process, as that between our pilot version and version 1, during
which this selection occurs.
3. Making the questioning process effective. Having identified the set of
important questions, attention must be given to ensuring that the
interviewees can provide high quality answers thereto, and answers on
which we may rely. We found this entailed adding questions that
contextualised the main ones or helped to focus attention on their true
meaning.
4. Responding to corrections. We can expect the interviewing process to
highlight deficiencies in the structure of the KB. Hopefully, these will be
relatively minor, but they should be incorporated as part of the process.
This will entail producing new versions of the questionnaire that reflect
these changes in the KB.
What this means is that the process of building a KB can never be a
mechanical one, in which stage 2 is merely one of filling in the weights. It is
important that, even when the original knowledge source is of a high quality,
the knowledge engineer takes what Winograd (1995) calls a 'designer's-
eye-view', rather than a 'constructor's-eye-view', and that the process of
knowledge refinement (Basden and Hibberd, 1996) is recognised as
important.
6. TRUST QUOTIENT CALIBRATION
We have stated that a trust quotient value of zero means that a CA is regarded
by the experts to be absolutely untrustworthy and that a value of 1 means it is
regarded as being absolutely trustworthy (athough we have also noted that a
score of 1.0 is impossible to achieve. The maximum score possible from the
current system, by giving each question the highest quality answer, is 0.98).
But what does an intermediate value of say 0.5 mean? And what is the
meaning of a difference of 0.1 between two CAs' trust quotients?
Whilst we think that absolute quantitative calibration of the trust quotient
scale is too complex to achieve at the current time, we believe that qualitative
calibration of the scale is possible. There are two ways that a user can do this.
One way is to calibrate the trust quotient scale by running the expert system
against the CPs/CPSs of several well known public CAs. In this way a user can
attach KL meanings to the various scores on the scale. The other way is to
compare the trust quotient scored by his own CA, whom he knows and trusts,
against the trust quotient scored by the remote CA that he is trying to assess.
Both ways are necessarily subjective, and depend in part upon the personality
traits of the user and what s/he values so that different users may well provide
different answers to the same question from the same CPS. Many of the
questions posed by the expert system are based on judgements and
interpretations of the CPS e.g. "To what extent are damages covered in the
CPS?" or "How well do you feel the CA's private key is handled in the CPS?" In
addition, many CPSs are mute about a specific trust issue, so the user has no
objective way of deciding what answer to give to the expert system, so
different users will obtain different trust quotients from the same CPS. Thus
there are no absolute quantitative scores available at the current time.
We have run the expert system against the CPSs of several well known CAs.
Two are reported here for comparative purposes. Verisign is probably the best
known certificate issuer in the world. It is configured into all popular browsers
as a root CA, and provides a range of certificates from the low cost low trust
Class 1 certificates to the medium assurance Class 3. Viacode on the other
hand is the CA run by the UK Royal Mail and is a medium assurance CA. It
runs services for the UK government and the National Health Service.
On first pass through the expert system both Verisign and Viacode CAs scored
trust quotients of zero. On exploration of the KB as described above we found
that this was because several topics were not addressed in either of their
CP/CPSs and we had given these factors a score of zero. For example, there is
no mention about archiving audit logs by Verisign, there is no mention about
the network security controls applied by Viacode, and neither mention job
rotation of trusted roles. As we had no way of knowing from the CPSs whether
the CAs implemented these features very securely, or barely adequately or not
at all, we initially assumed not at all.
On the second pass through, we gave a score of 0.5 to all the questions for
which the CPSs provided no answers, i.e. we assumed that the CAs had
probably addressed these issues just about adequately. This still led to a trust
quotient score of 0 for Viacode because the use of the CA private key was still
not judged to be secure enough. If however, the CA private key usage factors
were set to very secure, then the trust quotient rose to 0.25 for Viacode. If we
then assumed that four of the unmentioned critical trust factors (namely
network security, list of audit compliance topics, job rotation and sanctions
against staff for unauthorised actions) were implemented very securely then
the trust quotient for Viacode rose to 0.9. This quite poignantly shows the
effects on trust that just a few critical elements can have, and how it is
important that in a CP/CPS all relevant factors are covered. Verisign fared
slightly better scoring a trust quotient of 0.45 for Class 3 certificates, when all
the unmentioned factors were given scores of 0.5. If the three most critical
missing factors (namely job rotation, protection of audit logs, and list of audit
compliance topics) were assumed to be implemented very securely, then
Verisign Class 3 certificates yielded a trust quotient of 0.87.
We did not find it possible to ever get a trust quotient above 0 for Verisign
Class 1 certificates. This is simply because no authentication is ever carried
out on the identity of the certificate subject (other than a limited verification
of their e-mail address). So no matter how trustworthy Verisign might be with
its internal CA operations, relying parties cannot realistically place much trust
in a signed message from a subject having a Verisign Class 1 certificate.
The process described above should be seen, not so much as commenting on
the trustworthiness of two major CAs, but as an illustration of the process a
user might go through in order to assess any CA. The first figure given by the
KBS should never be taken as final, but factors should be explored and given
several values in a what-if manner. The emphasis should be on finding out
which qualitative factors might be critical in any one case, rather than on
achieving a precise numerical score.
7. DISCUSSION
7.1 Roles and Benefits of the Trust Assessment KBS
It was originally hoped that the Trust Assessment KBS discussed in this paper
would be able to fulfil the role of an intelligent agent that could be called upon
by email and browser software to provide an automated assessment of the
trust that can be placed in the authenticity of the sender of a message. The
original hope was that no input from the user would be required. However, for
several reasons, this looks unlikely to transpire.
While it might be possible to translate extreme values of the trust
quotient into automated decisions, it is difficult to know how an
intermediate figure can be so used. Most quotients are likely to be in the
intermediate range.
Even though it would be feasible, in principle, for the KBS to take, as
input, a complete CP or CPS, and undertake textual analysis thereof in
order to obtain much of the information it needs, a significant amount of
required information entails too high an element of human interpretation.
At present there is little standardization of format or content, and the
differences between CPs and CPSs exacerbate this. In many cases the
required information is not stated explicitly in the document and must be
inferred from an overall reading, and in some cases other material must
be accessed, to enable the user to come to a judgement about the answers
to be given.
The output trust quotient, being a single figure, cannot meaningfully
differentiate all the factors on which a decision of trust can be made.
Each decision is made in a different circumstance, affected by economic
and personality aspects of trust as discussed above. It would be difficult
to include these aspects in the KBS in such a way as to preclude user
input.
Therefore, the KBS is most likely to be used in a decision support mode, by
which a human user interprets a CPS using the KBS.
By exploring the knowledge after arriving at a first trust quotient, in the
manner illustrated above, the user can identify at least two useful things.
Where the trust quotient is low, the user can discover which factors are the
ones that make it low. Then they can decide whether these factors are
significant in their own situation. On the other hand, if the trust quotient is
high, the user can explore the knowledge to identify on which factors this
result depends most crucially, and then they can decide whether these factors
are robust in their own situation. This kind of exploration involves a degree of
what-iffing, whereby the user tries new answers to questions and watches the
result.
The user benefits from such exploration not only by achieving a more precise
or robust view of the situation in hand but also by gaining a greater
appreciation of the critical trust factors that can affect such situations more
generally. In this way their knowledge is built up, to apply in future situations
of this type. The former benefit occurs by means to the KBS fulfilling what
Basden (1983) called the consultancy role, the role traditionally assigned to
knowledge based systems technology, but the latter is what he identified as
the knowledge refinement role, which, though not often discussed happens in
practice to be a major role of KBS.
7.2 Modes of Use of the KBS
Although using the Trust Assessment KBS as a completely automated
intelligent agent is unlikely to be very effective, three other possible uses of
the KBS have emerged.
Two of these ways are similar to the hoped for automated assessment: to
assess the trust that can be placed in the authenticity of the supposed sender
of a specific communication, and, more generally, to assess a CA as a whole. In
the latter type of usage, different CAs can be compared. In both these uses,
the user would run the KBS with the relevant CPS and other material to hand.
Running the KBS takes between one and several hours to reach a trust
quotient, depending on how easily the CPS can be interpreted by the user and
on how much exploration of the knowledge is undertaken. Exploration would
be advisable when comparing CAs since they might fail on different factors,
and so would perhaps be suited to different types of Internet work.
However, a fourth, new, type of usage for the KBS has emerged: to aid CA
administrators in the design of new CA services and their controlling CPs and
CPSs. This was first suggested in discussion with one of our partners, Tim
Dean of the U.K. Defence Establishment Research Agency. For military uses
especially it is necessary to ensure that there are no weak points in
certification policy or procedures, but it is often difficult to be confident that
all possibilities have been considered. Therefore a KBS that holds reasonably
complete knowledge can be used in a checklist role (Basden, 1983) in which
the user is stimulated by the questions asked by the KBS to consider things
they would normally take for granted. KBS technology does not suffer from
the lapses of memory that inflict human beings. For this reason, running the
Trust Assessment KBS for a prototype CP or CPS can identify areas of
weakness. The ability to explore the knowledge that the KBS offers is
particularly important here. Thus the problems that we experienced when
evaluating the CPSs of Verisign and Viacode, due to their muteness about
certain aspects of trust, would be obviated if the CA administrators had used
the KBS to ensure that every trust topic has been addressed in their CPSs.
7.3 Automating the Trust Assessment
The process of arriving at a trust quotient is time consuming, and requires
considerable skills on the part of the user. Most Internet users do not possess
the required level of skill (nor for that matter the patience) necessary to run
the KBS. It would be far better if the CA administrator could run the KBS once,
complete all the sections in the knowledge base, and then export the
completed data to a structured file. This file could then be published on the
Internet along with the CA's textual CPS and CP. We have added this capability
to our system, so that we can now produce an XML formatted trust related
subset of the CPS. The KBS can then extract the answers to its questions from
this XML document, and produce a trust quotient based on the CA
administrator's subjective assessment of their CPS. Clearly this exposes the
relying party to risk where the CA's procedures in practice do not adhere
closely to their published policy, or the administrator's assessment of them. To
this end, we have considered how we might extend the expert system to assess
actual practice.
7.4 On Assessing Actual Practice
At first sight, it would seem that the knowledge base required for making
such an assessment might be similar to that described here. For example,
questions that ask "Does the CPS state X?" could be reworded as "Does the CA
actually carry out X?". However, there are several complications before such
assessment can be a reality. We have found that more substantial changes
than these must be made to the KBS, and that several changes would be
required to the legal infrastructure of the Internet. The changes we believe to
be necessary include:
1. Some questions currently asked about the CPS are irrelevant when
considering actual practice. Conversely, new questions must be added.
Nevertheless, we believe that the bulk of questions will remain relevant.
2. Of those questions that remain relevant, it might not be sufficient
merely to reask them in a new form ("Does the CA actually carry out X?").
In some cases, any differences between the answers might provide
important indicators. For example, if it is found that a CA consistently
underperforms in one area, then we might be justified in giving it a lower
trust quotient than if its underperformances were randomly distributed
in both time and topic area.
3. How do we obtain answers to the new types of question? We have
identified at least three distinct possibilities. In some questions, this can
be assessed by observation. For example, if the CPS says that the CA
publishes revocation lists every 24 hours, a good indicator of actual
practice comes from examining such lists every 24 hours over a period of
time. (To do this, however, requires action in advance of the need to
assess trustworthiness.) For some other questions marketplace rumours
can supply the necessary information. However, for the majority of the
information required, a new mechanism is likely to be needed: an Audit
Certificate.
4. An Audit Certificate is an electronic document produced by the
organisation that is authorised to make audit checks on the CA. When
making such audits the auditor compares actual practice with published
procedures, and compiles and publishes his results in a digitally signed
Audit Certificate. These certificates are then made publically available on
the Internet. For this to become a reality such mechanisms would have to
be established and formally recognised as part of the legal infrastructure
of the Internet, in much the same way as the publishing of a limited
company's financial accounts is currently a legal requirement.
5. To fully integrate the processing of Audit Certificates with the
operation of a trust assessment KBS of the type we are proposing, the
audit certificates should be in a standardised, computer-readable format.
To this end, we have examined the possibility of publishing Audit
Certificates as X.509 Attribute Certificates containing an XML formatted
audit attribute. Since Istar has already been modified to export its
knowledge base in XML format, thus giving us the ability to automatically
generate XML versions of the trust components of CPSs, it would appear
that Istar could be further enhanced to compile XML audit attributes.
6. We have experimented with two mechanisms by which the Trust
Assessment KBS, run by Istar, might obtain the Audit Certificate
information.
a) A specialised Trust Check Server would be accessed by the KBS,
with requests for the necessary information. The Trust Check Server
would, as part of its activity, continually retrieve Audit Certificates
and CRLs. We have constructed a pilot version of such a Server, and
modified Istar to communicate with it. This is described in (Ball,
Chadwick and Basden, in submission).
b) The KBS software (Istar, in our case) could be modified to read
and process the Audit Certificate directly. This has both a
disadvantage, of increasing the complexity of the KBS, and an
advantage, in that it is likely that some of the knowledge currently in
the KBS could be capitalised upon to perform the necessary analyses.
7. Whichever implementation route is chosen, the contents of the Audit
Certificate must be well defined. From our initial investigations, it seems
that this can be defined by the information the KBS requires in order to
calculate a trust quotient.
8. CONCLUSION
We have shown how we have built an expert system for computing the trust in
public key certification authorities, and described some of the technical
complexities in building such a system that have not been fully discussed
elsewhere. We have discussed the roles and benefits of such a system when in
use, giving examples of its use with current public CAs. Finally we have
proposed future extensions to the system so that trust can be recomputed not
only from what a CA says it does, but also from what it actually does in
practice, as viewed by its auditor. To enable such a system to operate will
require legal changes to the infrastructure of the Internet, to mandate that
public CAs annually publish their Audit Certificates.
The more general significance of this work, and in particular the latter
suggestions lies in the impact that technology can have on high level
infrastructure and strategy. It has been observed that the usage of expert
systems can radically change the role that their users play and their working
relationships (Castell, Basden, Erdos and Barrows, 1995, Basden, 1994). We
have discussed similar changes in ways of working here that are made possible
by the features offered by KBS technology. But we can glimpse the possibility
of an even more fundamental structural change being brought about by the
use of KBS technology: the establishment of an entirely new legal
requirement, the annual publishing of an Audit Certificate by a public CA.
Further, the contents of the parts of the new infrastructure, the Audit
Certificate, would be defined, not only by the general deliberations of lawyers
and auditors, but by the very specific requirements of the front-line KBS,
namely that KBS that assesses the trustworthiness of a CA from its Audit
Certificate. In this way we can, perhaps, see the possibility of a fruitful
symbiosis emerging between KBS technology and legal infrastructure.
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